




Education (Student Support) (Repayment) Regulations 1999
DRAFT REGULATORY IMPACT ASSESSMENT

INTRODUCTION This Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) sets out the likely costs to business of proposals for the Education (Student Support) (Repayment) Regulations 1999 from the April 2000 start date. These costs depend on the student number forecasts underlying the Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR) settlement to 2001/02. Beyond the end of the CSR period there are no firm Government plans for student numbers. This RIA is, therefore, based on working assumptions which assume a further increase in participation in the medium term (to a 40% young Age Participation Index, ie. under 21, by 2007/08) and constant participation thereafter.  These regulations​[1]​ define an income contingent scheme for repayment and are an integral part of the new student support arrangements which the Government is introducing to address the growing pressures on higher education funding in the United Kingdom, in order to support the Government’s plans for increased participation levels in higher education.  While student numbers have risen by 70 per cent since 1989, funding per student has fallen by one quarter.  Maintaining and, over time, increasing student numbers cannot be afforded on the basis of the funding arrangements which this Government inherited when it took office. The problem has been recognised for some time.  In May 1996, a National Committee of Inquiry under Sir Ron Dearing was appointed to consider options for reform.  The Committee reported in July 1997 and, at the same time this Government announced a package of measures, including the replacement of grants with loans (with special help for those facing particular hardship).  It also announced that loan repayments would be linked to a graduate’s income - in accordance with its manifesto commitment:  “The costs of student maintenance should be repaid by graduates on an income-related basis, from the career success to which higher education has contributed”.  There followed a period of consultation on these proposals in tandem with consultation on the Dearing report.   The means to implement the proposed package of reforms were enacted in the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998.  Section 22 of the Act enables loan repayments to be collected through the tax system, in accordance with another recommendation by Dearing.  In particular, it provides the authority for the Secretary of State to make regulations:imposing obligations on employers to deduct amounts due from borrowers from emoluments payable to those borrowers, andapplying or extending any provisions of the Taxes Acts and of the Pay As You Earn (PAYE) regulations for purposes connected with amounts due from borrowers. These regulations set out in detail the basis on which loans will be recovered from borrowers within Pay As You Earn (PAYE) and the Self Assessment (SA) tax system, including the responsibilities of employers in relation to borrowers who are in employment in the UK and subject to tax under PAYEborrowers - in particular those who receive self assessment tax returns; andthe Board of Inland Revenue and its officers in relation to the administration of the scheme. Employer burdens The Government is committed to working with employers to minimise the administrative costs associated with these regulations and is also acting where it can to reduce administrative, tax and National Insurance Contributions (NICs) burdens on employers. Employer organisations have welcomed in particular the simplification of the administrative burdens on business as a result of the transfer of the Contributions Agency to the Inland Revenue and the planned transfer of national insurance policy to the Revenue, which will make it easier to achieve the gradual alignment of tax and NICs rules.  Dealing with one organisation rather than two should help to bring about a reduction in employers’ costs. The Revenue has also continued to improve the service that it provides to employers by, in particular, establishing an employers’ helpline, issuing new guidance material and placing new business advisers in local tax offices.
PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES The broad purpose of the regulations is to provide that new loans made to individuals in higher education shall be repaid on an income-contingent basis.  Nearly all individuals who take out a student loan from Autumn 1998 onwards, and all UK employers potentially, will be affected by these regulations. The main objectives are to provide that:the level of repayments are equitable; andthe scheme is administered in such a way as to minimise default rates. The arrangements have been widely welcomed as fair, progress and a great improvement on the current ‘mortgage-style’ system of loan repayments, under which all borrowers must repay at a fixed rate if their annual earnings exceed a given level, regardless of how much they earn above that level.  The principles underlying these arrangements received cross-party support during the debates on what is now the Teaching and Higher Education Act 1998.Thresholds The repayment threshold is not designed to be specifically linked to expected levels of graduate earnings. It is designed to provide a fair, income sensitive and graduated system for repayment now that student loans are the chief source of government support for maintenance costs. Because of the non-commercial rate of interest applied (equivalent to RPI) there is a considerable level of Government subsidy (about 50% for income contingent loans) based on projected average time- scales for repayment, default and cancellation of loans due to death, long term disability and individuals not having income in excess of the repayment threshold. Raising the repayment threshold would extend the time-scale for repayment and hence increase the level of subsidy. To avoid an increase in the cost, a raised threshold would need to be combined with an increase in the percentage rate applied to income above the threshold, but this would have the disadvantage of moving the scheme closer to the weakness of the present mortgage type of scheme.
Risk assessment The loan take-up rate and average loan used are consistent with CSR forecasts. DfEE will be considering what revisions to make to repayment forecasts once more information on the actual take-up, average loan and duration of study ​[2]​ (for effects on timing) become available. The first full graduate cohort to leave their courses will be those who started in academic year 1998/99, and become due to make payments in April 2002, though some borrowers will start to make repayments from April 2000. The first two years of repayment cover those on shorter courses or who have dropped out. Thus the characteristics of the first two years are likely to be somewhat different from the scheme once it is more fully up and running. DfEE estimate that in 2002 some 243,000 individuals will be earning above the repayment threshold compared with some 343,000 borrowers liable to repay with outstanding debt; by 2015 the equivalent figures will have risen to 2.3 million and 3.3 million respectively. See Table 1 of the Annex for intermediate years.
DETAILS OF THE SCHEME The Inland Revenue’s responsibilitiesThe Revenue will normally tell an employer if they have an employee from whom student loan repayments must be deducted. When repayments of a loan are first due to begin, including in the case of a new start employee who does not have a P45, the Revenue will notify employers accordingly. Employers will not be expected to make this decision in the absence of information. (In the case of new start employees already in repayment, employers will be required to establish this fact from information on any form P45 provided by the borrower).The Revenue will give employers clear guidance on what to do, which will include a table to help with the calculation they need to do. In the majority of cases these calculations will form part of the various proprietary software packages that are available for payroll work.Confidentiality will be maintained; and employers will not know the size of the student loans of their employees.  An employer will know only that their employee has a student loan. When deductions are to stop, for whatever reason, the Revenue will notify employers.BURDENS ON EMPLOYERS From 6 April 2000 employers will deduct student loans repayments from relevant employees – along with PAYE tax and NICs.  The deductions of loan repayments will be on a pay period by pay period basis and, following NICs definitions, they are not cumulative.Employers will work out the amount of the repayment.  Initially, the calculation of the repayment will be 9% of pay above £10,000 a year (or the weekly/monthly equivalent of £10,000); and timed to follow the pay frequency of the individual. Employers will record the amount of the repayment deducted on the employee’s payslipa Deductions Working Sheet (form P11 or equivalent)At the end of the month or quarter, employers will remit the amount of the student loan repayments deducted to the Revenue along with PAYE tax and NIC remittances.  They will have to show on the relevant Inland Revenue form (P32) the total tax (inclusive of student loan repayments deducted from employees’ pay)  and NICs (reduced by the amount of any tax credits paid to employees).At the end of the tax year employers will complete new entries on the relevant revised forms (P14, P35 and P60) showing the total amount deducted from each employee.A self-employed borrower does not make tax or NICs payments through PAYE, and so is not included within employer burdens. In this case, the burden on the self-employed borrower to make repayments is essentially a personal compliance burden falling within the self-assessment (SA) system, not an employer burden. However, a self-employed business with employees who are making loan repayments would have these burdens included within the calculation of total burdens. Typically some 12% to 13% of the overall workforce are self-employed.
Issues of equity or fairness The repayment rules are equitable, in that the level of repayment is linked to the borrower’s annual income. This is likely to be predominantly earned income, but those within SA (whether employed or self-employed) will have unearned income included, provided this exceeds £2,000.  Those with an income of less than £10,000 per annum will repay nothing; and so the largest contributions come from those who can most afford them.  In the cases of borrowers with two or more jobs (with separate employers), the borrowers will have the benefit of the threshold separately for each employment. Aggregation against a single threshold will occur in the SA tax return, but not otherwise. Thus employers will have only one type of calculation to perform, and more borrowers will not be brought into SA because of the loans. This reduces administrative and compliance burdens outside of SA. .Some borrowers will work abroad and consequently be outside the British tax system.  An estimate of some 3.2% of borrowers has been made to cover those cases where the repayments will fall outside the Revenue’s powers. Such cases will continue to be the responsibility of the Student Loans Company (SLC).
Benefits of regulationsThe benefits of the regulatory regime proposed are as follows: income contingency - produces a progressive contribution regime and modest average contribution rates;IR involvement reduces the risk of default;IR already has mechanisms in place for assessing income and securing payments from both employees and the self employed, therefore collection would be relatively straightforward. 
Business sectors affectedAll employers in the private and public sectors who employ a borrower, ranging from micro firms (those with 1 to 4 employees) to large employers (those with over 500 employees) are potentially affected. However, because the number of borrowers in repayment is relatively low in the early years, it could be some years before many small employers will have to operate the scheme.  Charities, as generally small employers, are potentially affected by the regulations and included in this assessment.  
BUSINESS COMPLIANCE COSTS (RECURRING AND NON-RECURRING)OverviewCompliance costs to business for implementing the repayments system will be a mixture of recurrent and non-recurrent costs. It is likely that the recurrent costs will grow as the numbers of borrowers increase through time, though there will be high one-off costs in the first couple of years as the larger employers invest in new computerised systems - as far as it is cost-effective for them to do so.  On the whole compliance costs vary strongly with employer size - relatively high unit costs per borrower for small employers and low unit costs for large employers. Costs also vary markedly with the degree of computerisation. A large employer with a big computerised PAYE payroll system will face a relatively high initial non-recurrent cost and generally a low subsequent recurrent cost profile (except for the volume of  enquiries). A small employer with a manual PAYE system will face a small non-recurrent cost and subsequently high recurrent costs. Nevertheless, many employers with low numbers of borrowers would probably find it more cost-effective to operate manual procedures to deal with the deductions from pay than to go for a full computer software solution. There is also the possibility of a large number of employers becoming involved with borrowers in casual work after finishing their courses. Such casual work, or part time work, might be sufficient to trigger a repayment, on a weekly or monthly basis, in that employment. That is provided that their earnings exceed the weekly or monthly equivalent of the £10,000 threshold. Any individual work disincentives are on a pay period basis, whereas the present repayment scheme is based on a much higher threshold (£17,784 this year) and three months cumulation, but triggering a repayment of one fifth of the loan outstanding. There is also the added complication of job mobility within the tax year in the graduate workforce, that is one borrower may work for several employers for only short periods in the early part of their careers;  also there are some borrowers who are likely to have two jobs with separate employers at the same time. These effects may well add to the number of employers who may have to adjust their PAYE systems to cope with, and face enquiries about, deductions from borrowers within the first few years. Some of those in  the forecast of borrower numbers will be self-employed, though graduates may be unlikely to take up self-employment initially.  Self-employed borrowers will incur compliance costs within the self-assessment system not the PAYE deduction scheme; but by the usual definition these costs would be measured as individual costs and not employer type costs. Self employed businesses with employees who are borrowers will form part of the total employer compliance costs.  However, the numbers of self-employed borrowers are not likely to be large initially.  In later years, within an average 12 year repayment period, self-employed numbers could well be approaching the overall workforce average of one in eight, and so a profile of increasing self-employment up to the average has been assumed.Distinction between business and individual compliance costsThere is a distinction to be drawn between those costs falling on individuals, which are part of the repayment process, and those costs falling on employers . And there is a further distinction to limit the scope of the compliance costs, which are studied here, to only the repayment stages which match the Revenue’s (and employers’) involvement in the deduction scheme, and not the whole (earlier) process of loan arrangement.  An extension to individuals would require estimates of the amount of time spent and the value of time of (generally) graduate employees in completing returns and correspondence with the Revenue and their employer, until the loan is fully repaid.  In general the Revenue involvement is expected to reduce individual’s time spent relative to the time likely to be spent in an SLC scheme. This arises because individuals would no longer spend time on self-certifying income, as this would come automatically from the PAYE or SA system. That is time spent in gathering information for SLC on employment income from the past year, together with forecasts for the current and next tax year together with any unearned income plus any other explanatory information required, which would then be provided by self-declaration to SLC, would be saved. This individual saving could be worth on average 1 to 3 hours ​[3]​with extra time savings for some cases where information is subsequently found to be wrong, lost or late. There are further time cost considerations to do with tracing defaulters or non response. Overall it is likely that individuals will spend less time because of a more efficient determination of the level of income brought about by the Revenue’s involvement. Non-recurring compliance costs Non recurring compliance costs for employers are essentially for: changing the existing payroll system (IT department), assimilation/training in payroll department and possibly human resource department issues linking loans to recruitment and staff policy generally. It is assumed that all large private sector employers and government invest in a software system (either purchase a bespoke product or develop their own code)  to be able to operate a fully featured scheme to handle loan repayments as a separate module within their payroll for the first year 2000-01. The medium sized employers are assumed to wait for a year or two, as some will have no cases in the first year, but all will be ready for 2002.  The small employers are assumed to split: half to purchase a basic software product from a software house, again timed for around 2002 or a little later; and half to cope with essentially a manual ad hoc arrangement to cover any repayments that they might have. Thus for the largest employers it is clearly cost-effective to develop a full software solution, but for the bottom end of the small employers it is probably more cost effective to operate manually.  The tightness of the software development cycle and the initial low volumes suggest that for employers other than large or government, some phasing in of a fully featured system is likely. On our assumptions​[4]​ about the allocation of borrowers to micro, small, medium and large or government employers, it is estimated that by 2002/03:effectively all large employers and government employers, approx 7,000 employers, will have a fully computerised payroll for the collection of student loans;some 5,000 medium sized employers will have a fully computerised payroll for the collection of student loans to handle one or more employees as a borrower in repayment ;some 25,000 small firms will have one or more employees as a borrower in repayment - half of the employers will have a simple package to handle this and half will use largely manual methods;some 7,000 micro employers will have one or more employees as a borrower in repayment - all these employers will use manual methods. It is estimated that around £22 to £44 million will be spent to be ready for the first year and the total over the  first five  years is some £45 to £85 million. The bulk of this is spent by the large employers in the first year. The net present value of the expected total expenditure over the first five years is some £40 to £80 million. The full profile of non-recurrent expenditure is given in Table 2  of the Annex.One-off payroll training/education costs of familiarisation with the new system are included as a non-recurring cost item in the first year that an employer handles a repayment.Recurrent compliance costsRecurrent compliance costs for employers are essentially incurred for: manual processes on pay-days and at year-end (unless the routine work is computerised), on-going liaison with tax offices, annual licence costs or similar in house IT costs for maintenance of the repayment software, handling enquiries from employees (both their time and payroll staff time) and a range of miscellaneous tasks to do with handling coding notices, internal auditing and possibly dealing with staff  over errors. The total gross recurrent costs are generally reduced significantly by the interest earned, or overdraft costs reduced, from having the use of the cash flow for a period of time until payment is made to the Revenue. The gross cost less the interest advantage defines the employer’s net recurrent compliance cost. The net recurrent costs of this scheme will grow strongly over the period of the first fifteen years, and it appears that these will be larger in net present value terms  than the non-recurrent costs.  For example the forecasts for the period 2000 to 2015, using the DfEE estimates of borrowers in repayment and the associated annual repayments, shows that compliance costs build up to some £16 to £25 million by the end of the period from some £7 to £13 million in 2002/03 , see Table 3 in the Annex for details of intermediate years. This is best summarised by the estimate for the net present values​[5]​ of £125 million for the lower end of the range and £210 million for the upper end of the range. That is the recurrent costs are in net present value terms some two and a half to three times greater than the non-recurrent costs.Around 2005 the breakdown of the gross recurrent compliance cost shows that about a half of the total is due to payroll software costs (licences or support), around a quarter to manual costs, and the remaining quarter to a combined category for on-going liaison with tax office, handling codes and enquiries from employees.
COMPLIANCE COSTS FOR A ‘TYPICAL’ BUSINESS (RECURRING AND NON-RECURRING)In terms of numbers of borrowers making repayments a large employer is the most typical case. For these there is a significant offset to gross compliance costs from the cash flow benefit to employers from having the use of the repayments of loans for about 25 days per month before they are paid over to the collector - the cash flow benefit arises in the same way for income tax and NICs. This cash flow benefit helps the larger employers relatively more than the small. It is thus possible that the largest organisations (5000+ employees) with very efficient payroll systems and a large number of borrowers making repayments will actually gain more from the cash flow interest advantage than it costs them annually to operate. This parallels what happens for PAYE more generally (see the Bath Report for more details on the cash flow advantages of PAYE​[6]​).    
Small business litmus testThe small business litmus test is applied to estimate how regressive are the effects of the regulations on small businesses generally. An affected small business is typically an employer of 1 to 4 employees of whom one employee has a loan in repayment. From the known PAYE characteristics of such an employer it is very likely that the employer will incur extra recurrent compliance costs for: on-going liaison with the Revenue; probably monthly, possibly weekly, time costs for adjustments to pay and associated manual record keeping; certainly end of year reconciliation work; time spent on enquiries; and time and miscellaneous costs from handling the codes, audits and other activities. However, employers also benefit from the interest gained on the cash flow from the repayments.
There are some 650,000 employers with 1 to 4 employees; by 2005-06 it is estimated that there are likely to be around 20,000 to 25,000 such employers with one, or more, employees as a borrower making repayments. Such employers mainly use manual procedures to handle their PAYE, and so the additional work on the loan collection is likely to be manual. The cost per employer is assessed to be on average around two to three hours per year plus some expenses, say £45 to £70 per year net of the cash flow benefit for typically one employee with a repayment. Non-recurrent or start-up costs are likely to be small: typically there are some education time costs in reading the instructions  in the annual employer pack from the Revenue to handle the first case; these time costs are assessed to be about £10 to £20. If the employer were to use an agent or adviser to do the payroll, then the employer would probably face an increase in charges for services rendered of broadly the same amount as the manual costs.Clearly the majority of such micro (1 to 4) employers will not have to handle a borrower with a repayment, at least for the early years of the scheme. These unaffected employers will face possibly only a nominal time cost in checking the annual employer pack, in terms of knowing what they would have to do, if they were to employ such a borrower.  Other costs There are other costs to consider: IR & SLC incur costs in operating the new scheme, but this is expected to be cheaper than a scheme involving SLC alone to administer income contingency, so there are net administrative savings within Government. The Government costs incurred are as follows:Inland Revenue costs for developing and operating the scheme in financial years 1998/99 to 2001/02 are expected to be: £ 1.5, 9.5, 4.7, 1.2 million, (at May 99) respectively;SLC costs are expected to be reduced because of the Revenue and employer involvement. Overall it is likely that because of the change in the methods of collection, operating costs for DfEE are expected to be about half those of collecting repayments of mortgage style loans once similar volumes to 1997/98 are reached ;but  if the counter-factual were SLC operating an income-contingent scheme, rather than the present SLC mortgage scheme, then the administrative costs would be expected to be much larger than the proposed Revenue/SLC income-contingent scheme. Compliance costs for individuals.  Borrowers with non-employment income will incur some additional costs, such as reporting requirements within SA, completing returns, keeping records, and proof of investment income. This is properly an individual compliance cost. Some borrowers are likely to query with their employer any repayments, if this is in work time this is properly defined as an employer cost​[7]​, otherwise it is an individual cost. The regulations build on existing enforcement provisions applying to employers who operate PAYE and to taxpayers who complete self assessment tax returns.  Where a right to impose a penalty is available to an officer of the Board of Inland Revenue, the same rights of appeal to the Commissioners of Inland Revenue apply as they do in relation to income tax penalties. A small element of employer costs is estimated to cover enforcement provisions. In principle such actions may involve individuals with further compliance costs - mainly their time costs.
Results of consultations with businessSince May 1998, the Inland Revenue and the Department for Education and Employment have been in consultation with a group made of representatives of employers, payroll bodies and software suppliers about how the recovery of student loans through the tax system will work in practice. The representative bodies have provided invaluable insight into the implications of the scheme for employers and made helpful suggestions on many of the details of the scheme. Consultations will continue in the months running up to implementation.
SUMMARY OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
The  table below summarises the expected costs and expected benefits which are split between business, citizens and Government.  The Government has had regard to the fact that using the existing tax system as a means to recover loans is the most cost effective option currently available. Inland Revenue involvement will also significantly reduce the risk of default, because transferring the bulk of the collection of income contingent loans from the Student Loans Company will improve rates of recovery of payments.  It is expected that, in this respect, the new system will be more efficient than the present arrangements for recovery.  It should be noted that a lower default rate results in increased revenue, permitting lower taxes elsewhere.  But the resource gains are likely to be considerably lower than the extra revenue collected. The proposed SLC and IR combined option is more expensive than SLC with the present mortgage-style operation, but the proper counter-factual is a comparison with SLC operating an income-contingent system which would be considerably more expensive than the present SLC.  There are doubts as to how cost effective SLC would be with an income contingent system without IR and employer involvement.  If it could be done, the SLC alone system would suffer from a projected high default rate on the loans plus some probable deferral of payments because of  under-reporting of total earned income.  The advantage of the IR plus employer involvement is that this delivers an efficient income verification route and payments system, and offers a lower default rate.For example, a reduction in the default rate which is expressed in terms of a 1 per cent increase in the repayment income in Table 1 would be worth £20 million in 2010/11.  In total such a one percent improvement is worth £225 million, approx £125 million in NPV terms, over the period 2000-01 to 2015-16.  An exact comparison cannot be made since certain calculations which involve the assumptions about the projected changes in default rates are commercial in confidence pending the decisions about the terms of the student loan securitisation.  However, the value of the reduction in default (with any adjustment for treatment of this as a transfer payment against resource costs elsewhere)  plus the value of earlier repayments can be seen in general terms from the example to be significant, when measured against say the recurrent employer compliance of £125 to £210 million NPV over the period.Overall the balance of advantage lies strongly with using deductions through the payroll as a collection mechanism, and the involvement of the Inland Revenue is expected to be the means to delivering the reduced default rate over the period.
Monitoring and reviewThe Department for Education and Employment and the Inland Revenue will be monitoring and evaluating the implementation and impact of these regulations.

Contact pointsDepartment for Education and Employment - legislation/policy /costs for Government  Ian Morrison, HE Student Support Division 2Sanctuary Buildings, Great Smith Street, London SW1P 3BT.Inland Revenue - compliance costs for business Dr P Rice, Economics Unit,Somerset House London WC1R 6LB


SUMMARY TABLE  OF EXPECTED COMPLIANCE COSTS AND BENEFITS

	Expected Costs	Expected benefits
Business (including Charities)	non-recurring costs to employers of some £40 to £80 million in NPV terms in first 5 years;net recurring costs of some £125 to £210 million in NPV terms in respect of the period 2000 to 2015;small business with a borrower has relatively more compliance costs than a large company	an expanding and trained graduate workforce;some offset to gross compliance costs from interest on retention of loan repayment until paid over to the collector;
Citizens	some possible work disincentives around the £10,000 income threshold, and possibly other distortions around the £2000 unearned  income threshold;	reduced individual time costs of establishing income through use of PAYE system;better tracing of those with earnings from employment and better recovery via the Revenue systems, inherently less open to abuse.




                                                                                                                      ANNEX
Introduction

1. 	This Annex sets out an estimate of the employers’ compliance costs, of operating deductions from the pay of borrowers subject to PAYE in accordance with the Education (Student Support) (Repayment) Regulations 1999.  The costs are driven by the DfEE estimates (as at April 1999) of the numbers of individuals (ie borrowers in repayment)  earning above the repayment threshold £10,000 fixed nominal (though to be reviewed after 2 or 3 years) between the years 2000 and 2015, and are based on labour force and earnings survey data .


Table 1:  Forecast of income contingent loan repayments to 2015


















Note: costs at estimated 1999 prices.

2  The forecast of borrower numbers needs, as a first step, to be turned into a forecast of the number of employers with borrowers. Compliance costs related to PAYE for the borrowers can then be estimated within various types and size of employers.  The scheme would generate compliance costs within the firm as a system for  the PAYE deduction scheme would be needed, which incorporated the specifics of the calculation of the [monthly or weekly] deductions in accordance with the regulations  (or according to a table supplied by the Revenue). Separate adjustments are needed for the self-employed. 

Table 2: Non recurrent costs of employers








Note: costs at estimated 1999 prices. Row entries show employer expenditure to be ready for fiscal year shown.

Table 3:  Recurrent costs of employers

























^1	  This assessment accompanies the publication of a consultation draft of proposed regulations covering England and Wales only. The arrangements covered by these regulations will, however, extend also to Scotland and Northern Ireland where it is proposed similar regulations will be made.  This assessment covers total costs to business in the UK.
^2	  Both the length of the course students sign up for as well as completion rates are important, and it is possibly the former that is more likely to vary than the latter. This factor not only affects timing but also the average debt of those entering repayment. 
^3	  Indication of likely time commitment on average by individuals from SLC estimate.
^4	  We have slightly over-weighted the large and government sectors and correspondingly under-weighted the micro and small sectors on the basis of some evidence on graduate destinations in Boys & Kirkland, 1987, but borrowers will also include those without graduate qualifications. 
^5	  NPV calculated at 6% real discount to 1999 in real 1999 prices.
^6	  Bath Report, the tax compliance costs for employers of PAYE and NICS in 1995/96, Inland Revenue, London, 1998. 
^7	  Estimates of the time spent in dealing with queries by payroll staff have been included in the above estimates of employer burdens.
